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This paper introduces an evolvable Space Shuttle derived family of launch vehicles. It 
details the steps in the evolution of the vehicle family, noting how the evolving lift capability 
compares with the evolving lift requirements. A system description is given for each vehicle. 
The cost of each development stage is described. Also discussed are demonstration 
programs, the merits of the SSME vs. an expendable rocket engine (RS-68), and finally, the 
next steps needed to refine this concept. 
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I. Introduction 
n response to President Bush’s Space Exploration Vision, both NASA and the aerospace industry have proposed I various exploration architectures. The launch vehicles are a key element of these architectures. While some 
architectures are geared to exploit existing launch vehicles, many require the development of new vehicles to 
support manned flights and heavy lift. Three principle approaches are the “clean sheet” vehicle, further evolving the 
evolved expendable vehicles (Atlas V, Delta IV), or a new vehicle based on existing Shuttle elements and 
technology. In this paper we will present a concept for a family of Shuttle derived vehicles that satisfies initial crew 
delivery requirements and evolves to support “Mars and beyond” heavy lift requirements. 
The ideal launch vehicle development scenario for s u p p o a g  the Exploration Vision would be one in which the 
initial vehicle used to transport crew could evolve into the heavy lift launch vehicle needed to support Lunar and 
Mars missions. This “@e Vehicle” concept would greatly reduce overall launch vehicle development costs. If the 
end point of such an evolutionary path is a vehicle with 100+ metric ton lift capability, what would be the initial 
point on this evolutionary path? The concept begins with an In-Line Core Stage derived fiom the SSP External Tank 
used to launch the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). This core stage would be the basis for a future loo+ mt launch 
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vehicle. This paper discusses the system configuration of the Heavy Lift Vehicle in each of its evolutionary steps. It 
shows the relationship of the lift capability to the evolving lift requirements and discusses the cost impacts of adding 
the appropriate element at each step. 
The issues associated with engine selection are examined. In particular, the RS-68 and SSME engines are 
compared. The impact to performance, reliability and cost for each is discussed. Each of these engines has 
significant differences m perfiormance and cost that impact the vehicle design and aordability. The reliability 
enhancement of “engine out” capability is examined for each and the impacts in cost and pedormance addressed. 
Much of the analyses and design efforts leading to the conclusions presented are preliminary. The tasks 
recommended to verify these conclusions are discussed. These include refinement of the preliminary analysis on the 
In-Line Core Stage as a CEV launch vehicle in order to verify the technical feasibility of this concept. Also 
discussed is the determination of the time phased funding requirements of this process to determine if this 
evolutionary concept will in fact produce a funding requirement “wedge” that will fit into the funding availability 
%edge”. 
.. _ _ ~  IT. Evolutionary sieps 
The concept of an evolvable vehicle based on elements of the Space Shuttle parallels the Exploration Vision’s 
concept for spiral development. NASA has laid out five spirals for the journey to Mars. They begin with the 
development of the CEV in Spiral 1 continue with Lunar Missions in Spirals 2 and 3 and culminate with the human 
missions to Mars in Spirals 4 and 5 .  
Figure 1. NASA’s Spiral Develop Approach for The Exploration Vision (Project Constellation)’ 
The launch vehicle evolves fiom the initial capability to launch the CEV to a heavy lift vehicle for Earth to Orbit 
transport of Lunar cargo elements to an ultra-heavy lift vehicle for Earth to Orbit transport of cargo elements bound 
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Steo 1: MPTA I -ET derived core stage without Cross Beam and I Core Stage Development 
for Mars. Figure 2 shows this evolution, beginning with early ground based test articles to the Mars ultra-heavy lift 
launch vehicle. 
Spiral 1 Spirals 2 and 3 Spirals 4 and 5 
- r - 
Step 2: CEV Launch Vehicle 
Step 3: 70 mt Class HLLV 
Fairing 8 
adapter for 
6.5m x 25 m 
ET Derived 
Thrust Panels in Intktank, including 4 SSME’s - Tankage and Structure 
- M P S ,  Avionics, APU’s, RCS 
Upper Stage 
6.5m X 25m Payload Fairing with 
payload to core stage adapter 
- ET derived core stage with 4 SSME’s 
- Upper Stage 
-ET derived Core Stage with 4 SSME’s 
- Four Semnent SRB’s 
44 Klb 
(20 mt) 
Step 5: 100 + mt Class HLLV 
171 Klb 
(78 mt) 
-Five Segment SRI3’s 
- 6.5m X 25m Payload Fairing 
-ET derived Core Stage with 4 SSME’s Modify Upper Stage for additional 
-Five Segment Sm’s propellant. - 9 m X 35m Payload Fairing Modify Payload Fairing for larger 
- Upper Stage payload volume. 
240 Klb 
(109 mt) 
ieg. 
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Figure 2. Launch Vehicle Evolutionary path matched to NASA’s Project Constellation 
Development Spirals 
The key element is the core stage of the vehicle which is developed for a first use as a main propulsion test 
article. This initial core stage is designed and tested using all of the requirements for each step in the evolution. This 
minimizes the development costs for each subsequent step of the evolution. The Steps in the evolution of the 
proposed family of vehicles are described in Table 1. 
Table 1. Configuration Changes along the Evolutionary Steps 
I - 6.5m X25m Payload Fairing 
I -ET derived Core Stage with 4 SSME’s Step 4: 80 mt Class HLLV 1 Five Segment SRB 
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IU. System Descriptions 
This family of vehicles is assembled from the subsystems and components of the Space Shuttle. These have a 
complete data base of cost, reliability and design information in existence. This significantly shortens the 
development process. In addition, these systems and components are currently man rated and are directly applicable 
for the first flight use of this family of vehicles. 
A. CEV Launch Vehicle 
The primary component of the CEV launch vehicle is the core stage. This stage provides the majority of the 
velocity to get to low earth orbit. This core stage will be developed using the components and manufacturing 
processes now used to build the Space Shuttle External Tank (ET). Figure 3 shows the ET heritage of the core stage. 
ET Core Stwe Similar in Construction to Current ET 
Forward Skirt 
‘%ukhM&a&without-Cross-Beam 
and Thrust Panels 
No Ogive 
Barrel Similar to LH2 Tank Barrel 
Fwd Dome Similar to LH2 Tank Fwd Dome 
Same Design but Stronger 
No Orbiter Attach Hardware 
No Longerons in Aft Barrel 
Three of Five Frames have simpler design 
Aft Dome Similar to LO2 Tank Aft Dome 
Similar to Intertank But Shorter 
Thrust Structure Similar to two Cross Beams 
* .  
- ~~ 
1LO2 Tank __ 
htertimlc 
LH2 Tank 
Figure 3. Designs, Processes, Facilities, Tooling and Flight Hardware are In Place to 
build this Vehicle 
The core fuel tank is a minimally modified Shuttle LH2 tank in which the shuttle attach fittings are deleted and 
the tank panels sized to take the additional thrust loads. The intertank would delete the cross beam and thrust 
panels, replacing them with skin and hat stringer panels. The forward LOX tank would have the same capacity of 
the current design, but with the ogive section replaced by an ET LH2 forward dome and the barrel section replaced 
with two modified barrels, to take the axial loads. This stage will be designed for the heavy lift loads, for 
commonality for each Step in the Evolution. 
The Aft Skirt includes the engines, main propulsion system, thrust structure, and APU’s. The main engines are 
currently base lined as unmodified Space Shuttle Main Engines; options for when the existing stock of SSME’s have 
run out are Block II SSME’s or a re-designed expendable SSME (E-SSh4E). The M P S  is derived fiom the Space 
Shuttle M P S ,  with simplifications for non-reusability. The Auxiliary Power units for hydraulics are derived from 
the H-APU’s used in the SRB’s. 
The final velocity increment is provided by a relatively small upper stage. The sizing for this upper stage is 
shown in Figure 4. Given the performance ofthe core stage, the performance of the upper stage versus payload mass 
to a 220 nm by 28.5’ orbit was calculated. This was expressed in terms of velocity change provided by the upper 
stage. This was calculated assuming two different isp’s, therefore there are two curves. An isp of 440 seconds 
corresponds to a LOXlHydrogen engine and an isp of 280 seconds corresponds to an engine using. storable 
propellants. As shown in Figure 4, the best solution for a CEV weighing 20 mt was determined a LOX/Hydrogen 
upper stage providing a delta velocity of 5000 feet per second. Guidance navigation and control (avionics) are 
EELV Derived, in order to minimized development and cost. The current avionics equipment used on the Space 
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Shuttle is no longer in production and suffers obsolescence issues. This leads to the conclusion that adapting existing 
EELV technologies offers a more cost effective, solution than recreating the Space Shuttle avionics. 
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Figure 4. Weight to Circular Orbit vs. Second Stage Velocity Delta 
B. Heavy Lift Launch vehicle for Lunar Cargo Missions 
The intermediate lift vehicle starts with the same core stage in the CEV Launch vehicle. The intertank reverts to 
the ET configuration, adding back the thrust panels and SRB beam to accommodate a pair of Space Shuttle SRB’s. 
The vehicle is topped off with a payload interface and fairing sized to provide a clear payload envelope of 6.5 m 
diameter by 25m long. The baseline SRB’s are the 5 segment SRB’s originally proposed for Space Shuttle 
Upgrades. These boosters add an extra segment and change the binder fiom polyacrilanitrile (PAN) to hydroxyl- 
terminated polybutadjne (HTPB). The comparison of the 5 segment solid rocket motor compared to the standard 4 
segment Space Shuttle solid rocket motor is shown in Figure 5. The standard SRB is an option, with a likely 
reduction in performance of about 8 mt. The in-line confguration is capable of placing 78 mT into a 220 nm 28 
Figure 5. Performance of the 5 Segment Solid Rocket Motor 
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C. Ultra-Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle for Mars Missions 
The heavy lift vehicle is created with the addition of a large, LOX/Hydrogen upper stage and an expanded 
fairing. The baseline upper stage (see Figure 6)  uses 245000 lbs of propellant in tanks the diameter of the basic ET. 
It's powered by a single J-2s engine, a derivative of the second and third stage engine that powered the Saturn V. 
Upper Stage Configuration 
Propellant Tanks: Structurally stable 
aluminum orthogrid wl common bulkhead 
Aluminum Thrust Structure 
52 S 
Storable KCS ~ _ _ _ _ _  
Ambient He pressurization 
Redundant Avionics 
Passive Avionics Cooling 
External Propellant Tank Insulation 
Insulate LO2 Tank 
Figure 6. Upper Stage for the Ultra-Heavy Lift Launch vehicle for Mars Missions 
The fairing is sized to provide a clear payload envelope of9m diameter by 35m long. Vehicle configuration and - 
formance is shown in Figure 7. 
zd stage Ignite MN 1- 
sec Coast 
PL Prondes Orbit 
DO x 30 mi 
Sub-orbttal 
T-740sec P Stage Separation 
Amtudc Control 
Fmwded by Payload Ocean Recovery 
Re 
5- 
Figure 7. Earth to Orbit Mission Profile 6 for the Ultra-Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle 
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N. Cost Impacts along the Evolutionary Path 
The challenges of developing a new manned space vehicle and returning to the moon are not technical, they 
are financial. We have done this all before but can we do it without the massive budget expenditures of the 1960’s. 
NASA has adopted a three part strategy to meet this financial challenge. The first part of this strategy is 
Strategy Based on long-Term Affordability 
FY73 FYI5 W16 N17 FYI8 Fy19 Mo 
Figure 8. NASA’s Financial Strategy for CEV Development and the Return to the Moon 
minimal increases to the NASA budget. Figure 8’ shows these increases. Also shown in Figure 8 is the second part 
of the NASA strategy, the end of the Space Shuttle Program and then the end of the International Space Station 
program. The elements in Figure 8 that represent the Exploration program include the Crew Exploration Vehicle 
(CEV), HumadRobotic Technology development program and Exploration Missions. As the Space Shuttle and 
Space Station programs phase out, the Exploration budget increases. These two parts of the NASA strategy will 
create the funding required to execute the Exploration program. 
The final part for the NASA financial strategy is the spiral development approach illustrated in Figure 1. When 
this approach is applied to the launch vehicle, an evolutionary path illustrated in Figure 2 is the result. Each vehicle 
along the path has its utility based on the requirements of that spiral but, at the same time, is a building block for 
future vehicles. The benefits of the evolutionary approach are further enhance when the use of Space Shuttle 
elements, components and processes are employed in the development of these vehicles. In essence, the Space 
Shuttle is really the fist step in the evolutionary development path. 
* 
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There are three main financial effects of this evolutionary development process. The first is that the total cost of 
this process will be more expensive than developing the TJltra-Heavy Lift Vehicle directly by as much as twenty to 
thirty percent. In Figure 9, it is evident that the sum total of the cross hatched areas representing the evolutionary 
development cost per year is greater than the sum total of the area representing the “stand alone” development cost 
per year of the Ultra-Heavy Lift Vehicle. The second financial effect is that you get three vehicles for this added 
cost, one of which (the CEV Launch Vehicle) will be required in every spiral of the exploration program. The third 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 
Year 
Figure 9. Evolutionary Development of the Launch Vehicles Required for Exploration yields 
significant reduction in yearly expenditures. 
financial effect is the reduction in peak yearly development cost for the launch vehicles required to support the 
Exploration program. This effect is very evident in Figure 9 and persistent for eight years. This is the primary 
benefit of the Spiral Development approach. It greatly enhances the affordability of the Exploration program by 
delaying developments until they are required and building on the developments achieved in previous steps in the 
12.00 1 
- 
8 
e, 0.00 J 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 
Year 
Figure 10. Launch Vehicle Evolutionary Development Costs as a percentage of NASA’s 
Exploration program Budget 
evolution. These affordability benefits are further illustrated in Figure 10. Assuming the Exploration budget 
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shown in Figure 8 (Exploration Missions, Human/Robotic Technology and CEV) and the Exploration launch vehicle 
development costs shown in the cross hatched areas of Figure 9, then’the costs for developing the Exploration 
launch vehicles never exceeds ten percent of the NASA Exploration Budget and for all but a few years, never 
exceeds five percent. This shows that the evolutionary process allows development of the required launch vehicles 
without burdening NASA’s exploration budget. The exploration budget can then be allocated to the more 
challenging tasks of developing the space craft and extraterrestrial surface craft required for the manned exploration 
of the solar system. 
V. Impact of Engine Selection 
This family of vehicles is designed to use liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen propellants for the main core stage 
engines. The data shown assumes the use of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). Another possible main engine 
selection for the core stage is the RS-68 engine that is used on the Delta IV vehicle. Criteria for the engine selection 
include performance parameters of thrust, thrust-to-weight, and specific impulse to achieve desired payload 
capability; reliability; non-recurring and recurring cost; and risk. Toe fdb~hg is z s c m ? q  of each engine. 
SSME - The SSME is a high performance staged-combustion rocket engine that bums liquid oxygen (LOX) and 
liquid hydrogen &ID) at a mixture ratio of 6 pounds LOX for every pound of LH2. It develops a rated thrust of 
470,000 pounds (vacuum) with a specific impulse of 452 seconds. Figure 11 shows the engine and its operating 
parameters. The engine was developed in the 1970’s as a reusable engine, and it has gone through a number of 
upgrades and block changes to increase its reliability. The engine can be throttled fi-om 67 to 109 percent of rated 
power. The current configuration is designated as Block 11, and it has been operational since its first flight on STS- 
104 in 200 1. The SSME is attractive because it is hlly certified for human-rated flight, and because residual engine 
assets would be available for use after retirement of the Space Shuttle. Both Phase II components and Block II 
engines and components are acceptable for use for a cargo application. Approximately 14 Block 11 development and 
flight engines are expected to be available at the conclusion of the Shuttle program, and approximately 18 sets of 
Phase Ll engine assets (2duct Powerhead, high pressure turbo pumps, and standard throat main combustion 
chamber) are also available. The Phase 11 assets are not complete engines because the low pressure turbo pumps, 
ducts, nozzles, valves and lines were essentially unchanged for use with the Block 11 engine. 
Because reusability requirement is not applicable, it provides an opportunity to make some design and 
processing changes to reduce costs. One necessary change is to design a new controller because many of the 
components in the current controller are obsolete. There is an opportunity to both simplify the construction and to 
take advantage of the advances in electronics. One option being considered is to develop one electronic box with 
redundant power supply and separate computer cards for each of the engines. Simplified input-output boxes may be 
used on the engines to minimize the cabling for the instsumentation. Other candidate changes to reduce cost and 
improve processing cycle time are to: a) eliminate items required for reuse such as protective coatings for hydrogen 
environment embrittlement, b) replace flex joints with flex hoses, c) switch to brazed main combustion chamber 
construction versus electroplated, d) use channel wall nozzle versus tube nozzle, e) replace hot-gas-manifold 
forgings with castings, and f )  use brazed versus inertia welded injector posts. Each of these candidate changes 
requires further definition and study and consideration for the development and certification costs. Unit cost 
reductions are estimated to be to 25 percent. 
Cycle 
Propellants 
Thrust, vac (lbs) 
109% 
104.5% 
Isp, v (sec) 
Pc @ 109% (psia) 
Mixture Ratio 
Area Ratio 
Weight (lbm) 
Throttle Range (%) 
Reliability 
Length (in) 
Dia. (in) 
Staged Combustion 
L02LH2 
5 12,271 
490.847 
452 
2,994 
6.0 
69 
7,748 
0.9992 
168 
96 
67-109 
Figure 11. &ace Shuttlwain Engine (SSME) 
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RS-68 - The RS-68 engine is a gas-generator cycle engine that also bums LOX and LH2 at a mixture ratio of 
6:l. It develops a thrust of 758,000 pounds (vacuum) and specific impulse of 409 seconds. Figure 12 shows the 
engine and its operating parameters. The RS-68 is the first commercially developed booster rocket engine in the 
world. It was developed in the late 1990’s for the Delta N vehicle which first flew in 2002. Using new design 
tools, simplified engine cycle, mature technologies, margin to experience, and a rich history in the development and 
operation of LOX-LH2 engines, Rocketdyne was able to design, develop and certify the RS-68 for approximately 
half the historical cost for new engine development. Because of its robust design with minimal part count, the RS- 
68 has excellent reliability. A number of proposed upgrades (regenerative cooled nozzle, injector modifications and 
turbo pump upgrades) have been evaluated that increase the specific impulse and thrust. Additionally, a new 
controller is planned to provide health management and engine-out control capability. 
Cycle GG 
Propellants L02/LH2 
Thrust, v/sl (lbs) 758 / 663 k (FPL) 
Isp, v/sl (sec) 409 / 357 
Pc (psia) 1,450 
MixtureRatio 6.0 
Area Ratio 21.5 
Weight (lbm) 15,000 
Reliability 0.9987 
Designstarts 30 
Design Seconds 3,000 
Length (in) 208 
Exit Dia. (in) 96 
mottle 57 / 102% (MPLEPL) 
Figure 12. RS-68 Engine 
The advantages of the RS-68 include higher thrust, low unit cost, short engine build cycle, and being in full 
production. Its disadvantages are higher engine mass and lower specific impulse. Additional study is necessary to 
determine whether the current RS-68 configuration is acceptable or whether some of the proposed upgrades would 
be required. 
The selection of the engine also impacts the gross lift off weight and size of the core stage. Because of the lower 
isp of the RS-68 and the higher weight of the engine, the amount of propellant required to achieve the same 
performance of the core stage using SSME’s increase between 30 and 40 percent. This results in a taller vehicle. 
This increase in height will impact facilities at the manufacturing site (the NASA’s Michoud Assembly Facility 
(MAF)), Kennedy Space Center’s (KSC) Vertical Assembly Building and possibly the barges used to ship the 
vehicle fiom the manufacturing site to the launch site. 
VI. The Next Steps 
Several actions are requged to verify these preliminary results. Initial analysis indicates that the CEV Launch 
Vehicle can Abort to Orbit with an “engine out” failure providing that failure occurs 1 to 2 minutes after lift off. 
Further analysis of the integrated abort capabilities of the launch vehicle and the CEV are required to determine if 
this provides the level of crew safety required. The upper stage for the CEV Launch Vehicle needs further definition 
to validate cost data. Since the mass properties of the Core Stage and upper stage are critical to the determining the 
feasibility of this concept, a more rigorous mass properties assessment is recommended. This would involve more in 
depth updates to structural sizing of the core stage, upper stage propellant requirements and main propulsion system 
sizing. 
Since the primary goal of an Evolutionary development program is to spread the development cost out to meet 
an evolving set of requirements, the cost profile of our concept should be refined and validated by a more detail 
“bottoms up” analysis. More detail in the avionics and software upgrades fiom step to step in the evolution is 
required to verify costs of these upgrades. Sensitivity analyses to show the effects of variations in requirements 
evolution are recommended. 
. .  
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The task with the most impact on this concept of evolving a family of vehicles is the choice of the core stage 
main engine. The RS-68 has two advantages that have yet to be explored in sufficient detail, especially as it 
concerns the CEV Launch Vehicle. The fist is the additional thrust. This could significantly enhance the 
performance of the CEV Launch Vehicle and possibly afford a successfid launch to orbit with an “engine out” 
failure immediately after lift off. The second advantage is the significantly lower cost of the RS-68. These cost 
savings have been preliminarily studied for the Ultra-Heavy Lift Vehicle and the results are encouraging. The 
primary benefit is the lower recurring costs of the RS-68. The cost of a single SSME approaches the cost of all the 
RS-68 engines require for an entire vehicle ship set. However, preliminary design studies on the Ultra-Heavy Lift 
Vehicle have shown that the use of RS-68 engines also have adverse impacts due to the increase sue of the vehicle. 
These issues need to be examined for both the CEV Launch Vehicle and the Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle. 
In addition to vehicle considerations, more detail is required in ground and launch operations to validate cost 
assumptions. With a large vehicle such as the Ultra-Heavy Lift Vehicle, trade studies are needed to determine the 
most cost effective facility support. These include such things as: a new launch pad vs. modified existing Space 
Shuttle launch pad, new mobile launch platforms and crawler transporters vs. modified existing ones, level of 
payload processing at launch site and the level of vehicle checkout required at launch site 
VIX. Conclusion 
The process of evolving a family of launch vehicles to support NASA’s exploration program has significant 
benefits for meeting the primary challenge of that program. That is, developing an affordable capability to send men 
back to the moon and eventually to MARS. Developing this family based on the components and processes 
currently used in the Space Shuttle Program is technically feasible and provides additional cost benefits. The 
analysis results presented are sufficiently positive that more detailed feasibility analyses are warranted. Significant 
findings include: 
A Spiral or Evolutionary Path has been defined which provides the Earth to Orbit launch requirements 
needed to launch manned exploratory missions to the moon and Mars. 
These vehicles can be developed by using Space Shuttle andlor other existing systems, components and 
processes. 
This evolutionary process combined with use of existing systems, components and processes allows 
development of Earth to Orbit launch vehicles in an affordable manner well within NASA’s proposed 
funding constraints. 
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